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Abstract: I offer a more or less friendly amendment to an influential set of 
proposals about scientific unification. After clarifying a few preliminary issues, I describe 
Kenneth Schaffner’s “General Reduction-Replacement” model of scientific unification. I 
then turn to its most recent descendant, the “New Wave” approach to reduction 
developed by Paul and Patricia Churchland, Clifford Hooker, and John Bickle. Both 
Schaffner and the New Wave interpret scientific unification very broadly in terms of a 
continuum from theory reduction to theory replacement. This is good insofar as it goes. 
But I propose to expand the picture in a way that is more receptive to the role that type 
irreducible and irreplaceable theories play in a process of partial reduction, specifically, 
their token reduction. The result is a more comprehensive “Reduction-Reception-
Replacement” model of scientific unification. I also suggest a link between token 
reduction, so understood, and the concept of mechanistic explanation.  
 
I. Introduction 
Discussions of reduction and related issues in the philosophy of science are 
complicated by at least two factors: ambiguity, or multiple concepts of reduction, and 
ambition, or the range of cases to which a given concept of reduction is thought to apply. 
First, regarding ambiguity, “reduction” expresses different concepts to different 
individuals and intellectual communities. For example, in contrast to evolutionary 
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explanations, the biologist Theodosius Dobzhanski identifies reduction with certain 
Cartesian methods employed in mechanistic explanation, and he cites the mathematical 
treatment of automata as a case in point (1968, pp.1-2). Yet, turning to a different 
intellectual community, many philosophers who are trained in classical computational 
psychology would not judge the mathematical treatment of automata and various 
complementary accounts of their mechanistic implementations to be reductionist in any 
substantial sense, being compatible with the autonomy of computational theory and the 
nonidentity of computational and physical properties.  
Thus, Jerry Fodor -- no friend of “reduction” in the philosophy of mind -- presents 
the computational model as a grand synthesis of mechanism and psychological 
explanation (1981, pp.13ff.). For someone like Fodor, the concept of reduction is more 
closely aligned with ideas that descended from the logical positivist tradition, 
specifically, the absorption of one theory by another via connecting principles that 
express property identities between two theoretical domains. That notion is not implied 
by mechanistic explanation per se. Indeed, some philosophers claim that notions based 
upon mechanistic explanation provide a better alternative to the notions of reduction that 
have dominated philosophical discussions in the post-positivist era (Bechtel & 
Richardson, 1993; Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000). 
Second, regarding ambition, after one settles upon a particular concept of 
reduction, and after one finishes the modest philosophical work of clarifying or refining 
the concept in question, there is the empirical task of determining the range of cases to 
which that concept of reduction applies. Here the most serious controversies arise, since 
virtually every existing concept of reduction applies somewhere, if only to marginal but 
well-chosen cases. So the most important question is whether a suitably refined concept 
can apply to a satisfactory range of cases which a critical mass of scientists describe as 
reduction, or, more ambitiously, whether, by the discovery of new information or a 
reconceptualization of the old, that concept of reduction can be extended to other 
unanticipated cases. Here the philosopher and the scientist face the danger of being 
overly ambitious. There is a significant difference between providing an account of 
scientific reduction versus defending a broad philosophical vision of physicalistic 
monism whereby all theories are either reducible to or replaceable by theories in the 
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physical sciences. For example, various psychological theories remain resistant to the 
concepts of reduction that developed out of the positivist tradition. Hence, theoreticians 
should be prepared to apply those concepts of reduction to the appropriate range of cases 
where the world happens to comply even if the world does not always so comply.  
With these preliminaries in hand, I begin by describing a concept expressed by 
Kenneth Schaffner’s “General Reduction-Replacement” account of scientific unification. 
I then turn to its popular descendant, the “New Wave” approach developed by Paul and 
Patricia Churchland, Clifford Hooker, and John Bickle. Both Schaffner and the New 
Wave interpret scientific unification very broadly in terms of a continuum of cases from 
theory reduction to theory replacement. This is good insofar as it goes. But I propose to 
expand the picture in a way that is more receptive to the role that otherwise and in other 
respects irreducible and irreplaceable theories play in a process of partial reduction, 
specifically, their token reduction. The result is a more comprehensive “Reduction-
Reception-Replacement” model of scientific unification.  
 
II. Schaffner’s General Reduction-Replacement Paradigm  
Schaffner’s views on reduction are meant to be an improvement upon the classical 
position that developed within the logical positivist tradition. Consider Ernest Nagel’s 
view of reduction, which represents the paradigm of positivist thinking on the subject. 
According to Nagel (1961), ‘reduction’ meant the derivation of a theory from a more 
basic or inclusive theory, in a heterogeneous case where the theories do not share a 
common vocabulary, by means of connecting principles that link the theoretical terms of 
the respective theories. As this tradition developed, the connecting principles were 
conceived in terms of biconditional bridge laws that express cross-theoretic property 
identities (Sklar, 1967, pp.120-124; Causey, 1972).  
Parenthetically, Robert Richardson (1979) and John Bickle (1998, p.120) claim 
that Nagel held a more liberal view, believing that the purposes of reduction could be 
served by weaker one-way conditionals that express mere sufficient conditions in the 
basic reducing theory. But the justification is based upon a footnote in Nagel which I 
believe has been misunderstood. 1 After mentioning Kemeny and Oppenheim’s 
observation that connectability would guarantee derivability if the connections between 
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the theories were biconditional in form, Nagel says: “However, the linkage between A 
[the nonbasic or “secondary” science] and B [the basic or “primary” science] is not 
necessarily biconditional in form, and may for example be only a one-way conditional” 
(1961, p.355, fn.5). Both Richardson and Bickle quote this passage, but they neglect to 
mention Nagel’s remark that immediately follows, namely: “But in this eventuality ‘A’ is 
not replaceable by ‘B,’ and hence the secondary science will not in general be deducible 
from a theory of the primary discipline” (loc. cit.). So Nagel’s view seems to be that, for 
a general account of the scientific practice in question, one cannot have the 
reduction/deduction of a nonbasic theory by virtue of one-way conditionals because they 
do not guarantee that the nonbasic theory is replaceable by the basic theory.  
Of course, Nagel scholarship aside, other positivists held the more liberal view in 
question (Hempel, 1966, p.105). But, as the tradition developed, many others stipulated 
that the connecting principles must be biconditional laws in order to justify cross-
theoretic identities. As Schaffner put it, “connectability later came to be best seen as 
representing a kind of ‘synthetic identity’” (1993, p.425). Indeed, one cannot achieve an 
important goal of reduction without such identities – a simplification in the world’s 
ontology. 2  
Yet philosophers of science in the post-positivist era observed that, for many 
central cases of reduction, the terms of the basic reducing theory only approximate the 
terms of the reduced theory. Using an example from genetics, Schaffner remarked that, 
until the late 1950s, the gene was typically defined in three ways: “(1) the smallest 
segment of the chromosome that could undergo mutation, (2) the smallest segment of the 
chromosome that could recombine with its homologous chromosome in crossing over, 
and (3) the section of the chromosome functionally responsible for a unit of character” 
(1967, pp.142-43). However, it was discovered that (1) through (3) have different 
physical referents, in particular, that (1) and (2) involve smaller sequences of DNA. 
Accordingly, geneticists in the 1960s began speak of ‘mutons,’ ‘recons,’ and ‘cistrons,’ 
respectively, where only the cistrons play roughly the role of Mendelian genes. Indeed, 
the notion of a gene has been further revised to include coding in RNA (see Weber, 
2005).  
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These developments were of some consequence. For it was then apparent that 
what can be derived from molecular genetics is a revised or corrected genetic theory and 
not the original theory developed by Mendel. Thus, Schaffner proposed an account of 
“approximate reduction,” supplying a set of formal conditions for the derivation of a 
corrected theory that is strongly analogous to the original reduced theory by means of 
connecting principles which preserve referential identity (1967, p.144). Along with the 
ideally exact form of reduction, Schaffner’s approximate reduction can be conveniently 
summarized as follows: 
  
 S DEDUCTION: either the original reduced TR or a strongly analogous corrected 
TR* is deduced from the basic reducing TB. 
  
 Moreover, because some scientists use the terminology of reduction to cover 
cases where the ontology of the original target theory is retained as well as cases where 
the ontology of the original target theory is replaced, Schaffner later extended his account 
to incorporate theory replacement. Specifically, in addition to either the direct (for TR) or 
approximating (for TR*) derivability conditions of S Deduction, Schaffner proposed that 
theory replacement involves the derivation of an “experimental arena” for the original 
target of reduction TR – a “domain” in Dudley Shapere’s (1974) sense -- which is the set 
of experimental results associated with TR that are better accounted for by the basic 
theory (Schaffner, 1977, pp.148-151; also 1993, pp.427-432). Viewing TR* in terms of a 
lesser set of experimental results means that, for theory replacement, the deductive 
consequence of the basic theory is still connected with but no longer strongly analogous 
to the original TR. The result is a “continuum of reduction relations” represented by a 
“General Reduction-Replacement Model” (Schaffner, 1977, pp.148, 149). It can be 
captured by the following convenient summary of his formal requirements for both 
approximate reduction and replacement: 
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S CONTINUUM: there is a continuum of strong to weak analogies between the 
reduced TR and the corrected TR*, with the strong relations justifying retention 
and the weak relations justifying replacement of the ontology of TR. 
 
III. New Wave Permutations on the Schaffner Theme 
Much discussion about reduction in contemporary philosophy of science has 
concerned “New Wave” theories developed and defended by Paul and Patricia 
Churchland, Clifford Hooker, and John Bickle. 3 These accounts are based upon the 
framework of Schaffner’s General Reduction-Replacement model, but they include a 
number of distinctive features. More specifically, the Churchlands, Hooker, and Bickle 
accept the framework of a derivational model, the role of a corrected theory in deduction, 
and the continuum of cases from reduction to replacement. But they also believe that 
Schaffner’s account is too permissive by allowing the corrected theory to contain 
elements of the uncorrected target for reduction. Hence, advocates in the New Wave 
place a condition on reduction that is central to their approach, namely, a base-level 
constraint on the resources used in the construction or development of the corrected 
image TR*. Paul Churchland says that: 
 
[A] successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping 
effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of TR (those of 
semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of TB 
that are theorems of TB. Call the set of such sentences TR*. This set is the image 
of TR within TB … on the account given above it is not the reduced theory, TR, 
that is deduced from the principles of TB, as some other accounts have it. What is 
deduced from TB is rather the set TR*, an equipotent image of TR within the idiom 
of TB (P.M. Churchland, 1979, pp.81, 83, with a change in the subscripts).  
 
Churchland stipulates that the corrected image TR* must be part of the basic theory, being 
“general sentences of TB” that constitute an “equipotent image of TR within the idiom of 
TB.” Or, as Hooker describes it: 
 
Within TB construct an analog, TR*, of TR under certain conditions CR   
 such that TB and CR entails TR* and argue that the analog relation, AR,   
 between TR and TR* warrants claiming (some kind of) reduction relation   
 R, between TR and TB (1981, p.49).   
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And again, regarding the constraint in question, Bickle labels the corrected image ‘IB’ to 
underscore its base-level nature, and he emphasizes the contrast with Schaffner’s view: 
 
It is important not to confuse Hooker’s deduced image IB with Schaffner’s 
corrected version of the reduced theory TR*. Hooker’s IB is characterized 
completely within the framework and vocabulary of TB; Schaffner’s TR* is a 
corrected version of TR, and so is characterized (at least in part) out of the 
resources and vocabulary of the reduced theory (2003, p.17).  
 
More precisely, as I read Schaffner, his account does not require that TR* be 
characterized (even in part) out of the resources and vocabulary of a nonbasic TR, since it 
is framed in a general way to allow for “homogeneous” cases where the reduced and 
reducing theories share the same vocabulary (Schaffner, 1967, p.144). Even so, 
Schaffner’s account allows that TR* be characterized out of the resources and vocabulary 
of a nonbasic and heterogeneously specified TR. But the New Wave constraint does not. It 
is uncompromising and exclusionary. It can be expressed thus: 
 
CH CONSTRUCTION: the language and concepts of the basic reducing TB, not 
the original reduced TR, must supply the resources for constructing the corrected 
image TR*. 
 
CH Construction is the main difference between Schaffner’s General Reduction-
Replacement model and the basic New Wave approach. 4 I have previously argued that 
this difference should be discounted, since (a) some of CH Construction’s advertised 
virtues are shared by competing theories, (b) the exclusionary demands of CH 
Construction appear to conflict with the co-evolution of theories where terms in the 
corrected theory TR* have developed out of the conceptual resources of both parent 
theories TB and TR, and (c) the adoption of CH Construction is unduly restrictive from a 
methodological point of view by ruling out reductive strategies that require aid from the 
concepts and vocabulary of the original reduced TR (Endicott, 1998a, pp. 60-67). 
5  
However, even if CH Construction is retained, I want to focus on the similarity 
between Schaffner’s model and the New Wave account, a similarity that exists by virtue 
of the fact that advocates of the New Wave accept the S Continuum. As Paul Churchland 
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puts it, because of the differing degrees of similarity between the original TR and the 
corrected TR* from one scientific case to another, “we must be prepared to count 
reducibility as a matter of degree. Like translation, which may be faithful or lame, 
reduction may be smooth, or bumpy, or anywhere in between” (P.M. Churchland, 1979, 
p.84). Or, as Patricia Churchland says: 
 
The evolving unifications seen in science therefore encompass not only smooth 
reductions with cross-theoretic identifications but also rather ‘bumpy’ reductions 
where cross-theoretic identifications are problematic and involve revision of the 
old theory’s concepts, and outright elimination with no cross-theoretic 
identifications at all (P.S. Churchland, 1986, p.284).  
 
Likewise, because of the variable analog relation between TR and TR*, Bickle says that 
“there is a spectrum or continuum of cases lying between the smooth and bumpy 
endpoints” from “perfect retention” to “total replacement” (1998, p.30).  
 
IV. An Exhaustive Reading of Reduction or Replacement  
Both Schaffner the New Wave appear to make an assumption that initially seems 
appropriate for the philosophical task at hand, namely, they appear to assume that a 
comprehensive account of scientific unification will only describe nonbasic theories that 
are either wholly reduced or replaced, or broken down into parts that are either reduced 
or replaced. Put in a different way, there is no place for irreducible and irreplaceable 
theories or irreducible and irreplaceable parts of theories on the S Continuum. The 
assumption seems clear in Schaffner’s case, since the formal conditions of his General 
Reduction-Replacement model are a simple disjunction of the conditions for approximate 
reduction and the conditions for theory replacement (Schaffner, 1977, p.149; 1993, 
p.429). Of course Schaffner permits “partial reduction” in a sense that will “allow for the 
possibility of a partially adequate component of TR being maintained” (1977, p.148, with 
a change in the subscript). But the implication seems to be that the adequate parts are 
maintained through reduction while the inadequate parts are naturally replaced -- no 
adequate parts that are unreducible and irreplaceable on the S Continuum. 
Or consider how the New Wave appears to treat the continuum of cases from 
reduction to replacement. On the one end there is perfect retention, and on the other end 
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there is outright replacement, while the area between those endpoints is occupied by 
mixed cases of reduction and replacement. For example, Bickle emphasizes the middle 
ground of theory revision for a number of scientific cases. But Bickle accepts no dualism 
-- be it a dualism of objects, properties, or laws (1998, pp.6-14). Therefore, in cases of 
theory revision, the elements of the original nonbasic TR are either retained through 
reduction or rejected, with a subsequent revision of concepts to reflect the distance 
between TR and its corrected base-level counterpart TR* (ibid., p.200). More precisely, 
according to Bickle, cases where TR is closely analogous to its base-level counterpart call 
for homogeneous ORLs (ontological reductive links) that provide a relatively smooth 
reduction of the property elements in TR, while middle cases where TR is not smoothly 
reduced but not outright replaced call for mixed ORLs, where some property elements are 
reduced by homogeneous ORLs and the rest are treated in a way that respects “the 
eliminativist strand of revisionary physicalism” according to which the properties “are 
abandoned as lacking actual extension” (ibid., p.202). Again, no irreducible and 
irreplaceable theories.   
But why is this exhaustive reading of reduction or replacement problematic if the 
goal is to supply an account of scientific unification where, in fact, either a reduction or 
replacement is carried out?  
 
V. Token Reductions as Partial Reductions 
The assumption that a comprehensive account of scientific unification will only 
describe nonbasic theories that are either wholly reduced or replaced or broken down into 
parts that are either reduced or replaced is problematic even when the goal is to provide 
an account of scientific unification and even when unification is understood in terms of 
processes like reduction and replacement that simplify the world’s ontology. Simply put, 
by giving place to type irreducible and irreplaceable theories, one is able to expand the 
range of partial reductions to include their token reduction. My working assumptions are: 
 
(1) Reduction (versus replacement) is ontological unification via cross-theoretic 
identities. 
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(2) An adequate theory of reduction should provide an account that subsumes the 
widest range of cases involving ontological unification via cross-theoretic 
identities. 
(3) Partial reductions that are accomplished through token identities provide 
ontological unification via cross-theoretic identities. 
And hence: 
(4) An adequate theory of reduction should provide an account that subsumes 
partial reductions that are accomplished through token identities. 
 
To begin, there is to my knowledge no exhaustive study of partial reduction. But 
philosophers have used the term ‘partial reduction’ in several senses. I will distinguish 
two. There is (A) a Mereological sense of ‘partial reduction’ whereby not all the parts of 
a target theory are derived from a basic theory, and there is (B) a Teleological sense of 
‘partial reduction’ whereby not all the perceived goals for reduction have been met when 
a target theory is derived from a basic theory. Thus, according to the mereological notion, 
a theory is decomposable into parts, where only a proper subset of those parts is subject 
to reduction. This notion can be further subdivided into categories that subsume cases of 
retention or replacement with respect to the entire theory, depending upon whether a 
significant number of its derivable proper parts are central theoretical structures or merely 
the experimental arena better accounted for by its successor theory (cf. Sklar, 1967, 
p.116, on the partial reduction of external sentences in a replaced theory).  
In contrast, according to the teleological notion, there may be a partial reduction 
even when all the parts of a target theory are derivable from a basic theory. For example, 
Hartry Field (1972, p.362) says that Tarski’s semantic theory of truth provides only a 
“partial reduction” of truth to nonsemantic terms, since Tarski’s theory utilizes primitive 
semantic notions like denotation for names and satisfaction for predicates. To understand 
why Field has the teleological notion in mind, let TR represent the set of sentences that 
English speakers assert to be true, and let TB represent Tarski’s theory of truth for the 
English language. Field does not deny that all the parts of TR can be derived from TB in 
the sense that every sentence that English speakers assert to be true is a theorem of TB. 
Rather, Field believes that, even though every one of those sentences is a theorem of TB, 
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the physicalist goal of providing a reduction of truth to nonsemantic or physical terms has 
not been met. 
Here I am only interested in the mereological sense of ‘partial reduction.’ More 
specifically, I am only interested in the kind of partial reduction that occurs when the 
subset of TR’s derivable parts describe tokens of the types in TR. Accordingly, TR is a type 
irreducible but token reducible. But TR is not just type irreducible. That is also true about 
replaced theories. Thus, my project is to incorporate their token reduction into a broad 
scheme of scientific unification from complete reduction to outright replacement, where 
the middle ground is not wholly occupied by nonbasic theories that are either reduced or 
replaced or broken down into parts that are either reduced or replaced, as it appears on 
the accounts developed by Schaffner and the New Wave. 
Proposals about token reduction are not new. Fodor (1974) outlined the general 
idea for the special sciences, and Steven Kimbrough (1979) developed and defended its 
application regarding the token reduction of genetics to molecular biology. Specifically, 
Kimbrough suggests a scheme of reduction functions for token cases. Changing his 
symbolism slightly, where ‘F’ is a predicate of a nonbasic type irreducible but token 
reducible theory TR, ‘P’ is a predicate of a base-level token reducing theory TB, ‘a’ is an 
individual constant in TR, and ‘b’ is an individual constant in TB, the reduction functions 
are: 
 
1. (for some x, y) [(Fx and Px) and (x = y)], 
2. a = some x such that Fx, 
3. b = some x such that Px, 
4. a = b (Kimbrough, 1979, pp.403-404). 
       
VI. Schaffner’s View of Token Reduction 
Curiously, Schaffner acknowledges token reduction and explicitly cites both 
Fodor and Kimbrough, but he does not attempt to extend the range of partial reduction by 
such means. Instead, he says “there is some truth in Fodor’s speculations and in 
Kimbrough’s contentions,” but he believes that “they are overstated in connection with 
reduction in the biomedical sciences generally and particularly in the area of genetics” 
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(1993, p.463). Yet his reservations appear to miss the mark. On the one hand, and 
perhaps because he is accustomed to thinking in terms of the traditional derivation of 
types, Schaffner says: 
 
First, it should be noted that, in genetics, it is not specific individuals demarcated 
in space and time that are identified; rather, the lac p and o genes present in many 
individual bacteria are identified with DNA sequences presumed to be repeated in 
many (a potentially infinite number of) instances (loc. cit.).  
 
But that surely is an overstatement, since (a) a complete formalization of genetic 
science contains singular terms, bound variables and constants for individuals, and since 
(b) the broader practice of genetic science must look at specific individuals and their 
specific genetic materials, otherwise the theory would be useless. At best, Schaffner has 
only observed that tokens are not types. He has not shown that a complete and fully 
adequate account of reduction should not encompass token reduction when the type 
variety is not forthcoming. 
On the other hand, Schaffner takes a different line by reinterpreting the proposed 
token reduction in terms of a more restricted range of (type) generalizations for the kind 
of middle-sized objects befitting the biological sciences. He goes on to say: 
 
[T]here is an element of truth in Kimbrough’s concerns. Reduction in genetics 
and, I suspect, much of biology and medicine appears to be more specific; it does 
not yield the broad generalizations and identities one finds in physics. This, I 
think, is due in part to the systems one studies in biology, and also to the kinds of 
theories one finds at what I have termed [in a previous chapter] the “middle 
range” (1993, p.465). 
 
And again, in his summary remarks: “a less misleading gloss of ‘token-token’ in 
theses contexts would be to construe the term ‘token’ as a ‘restricted type’ in accordance 
with the view of theories developed in [previous] chapters” (ibid., p.466). But, as 
Schaffner explains them, the restricted types in question are simply the types that are not 
as universal in their application as the types of basic physics, specifically, the types found 
in biology and the other special sciences (ibid., p.97). So Schaffner comes full circle to 
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the types of biology and the special sciences, and he nowhere explains how their tokens 
can be construed as restricted types, which seemed to be the proposal at issue.  
Of course, others like David Lewis (1969) and Jaegwon Kim (1992) postulate 
more restricted special science types to achieve the purpose of reduction. More accurately 
put, they postulate species-specific and even individual-time-specific terms in the special 
sciences that nonrigidly denote physical properties. So, if this narrow reductive strategy is 
successful, there is no need to speak of Fodor-style token reductions of irreducible types. 
Rather, there is a complete reduction of types, construed in the species or individual-and-
time restricted way. But others have argued, I think successfully, that species-specific 
terms fail to accommodate the inter-theoretic cross-classification that results from 
multiple realizability within individuals (see Horgan, 2001). Moreover, I have argued that 
the more restricted individual-time-specific terms are virtually indistinguishable from 
singular terms that pick out token events, and hence they fail to meet an essential 
desiderata for kind terms in the sciences, namely, being generalizable in the way needed 
for scientific explanation and prediction (Endicott, 1993, p.317).   
So Schaffner does not explicitly utilize a scheme of token reduction for type-
irreducible theories. However, his philosophical attitude about type irreducible theories 
permits such a scheme. For Schaffner is a methodological pluralist who accepts higher-
level presently irreducible theories on pragmatic grounds but denies their irreducible 
status “in principle.” In his words, Schaffner favors a “pragmatic, holistic, but in-
principle reductionist approach” that construes “theories in biology and medicine as 
essentially (for the present and foreseeable future) interlevel” (1993, pp.413-414). Indeed, 
Schaffner’s more recent work reflects a “reappreciation of the complexity by geneticists 
in the 1990s” that antireductionists had previously stressed about “many-many” 
mappings between genetics and molecular theory (2002, p.323). 6 So his “in principle” 
reductions are far removed from present scientific reality which contains type irreducible 
theories, and that is why my proposal to incorporate their token reduction, when 
developed, will constitute a more or less friendly amendment to Schaffner’s General 
Reduction-Replacement model of scientific unification. Keep type-irreducible theories 
for pragmatic purposes, and interpret the subsequent token reduction functions 
accordingly -- realistically where the world complies and instrumentally otherwise.   
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Why did Schaffner not explicitly incorporate a scheme of token reduction into his 
General Reduction-Replacement model if his methodological pluralism allows it? 
Perhaps Schaffner thought that the token reduction of type irreducible theories is trivial. 
As William Wimsatt put the point with respect to psychological theory: 
 
Without type-correspondence, property identification seems to be ruled out, and 
about the only kind of identity left is “stuff” identity – roughly, that the stuff with 
the psychological properties is the same stuff as the stuff with the physical 
properties. Philosophers, concentrating on ontological dividends, have found this 
to be uninteresting and trivial. It seems like a common sense conclusion that we 
hardly need scientific sophistication or data to embrace (1976, p.225). 
 
 But one would be wise not to accept Wimsatt’s casual record of commonsense, 
since the token reduction of type irreducible theories is hardly trivial. Without type-
correspondence, there is no guarantee that two theories drawn from different scientific 
levels of inquiry will carve up the “stuff” of the world into the same naturally isolated 
particulars that are subject to the same explanations and predictions. To use a well-worn 
example, many tokens of economic theory – monetary transactions, financial institutions, 
aggregate supplies, the economic cost for Enron from 1997-2000, the U.S. labor force in 
2006 – are not naturally isolated particulars subject to explanation and prediction from 
the vantage point of neuroscience, chemistry, or basic physics. I will return to this 
problem in the final section. But, in my estimation, the reason Schaffner did not 
incorporate the token reduction of type irreducible theories into his model of scientific 
unification is that it is built upon an assumption that excludes viable type irreducible 
theories. Specifically, Schaffner’s model is built upon the assumption that the corrected 
theory “bears close similarity” to the original target for reduction (Schaffner, 1967, 
p.144), which, when expanded into a continuum that includes theory replacement, 
implies the following Similarity Assumption: 
 
S ASSUMPTION: similarity is the parameter which determines the place of TR 
along the S Continuum, with strong to weak similarity relations between TR and 
its base-level derivable counterpart TR* determining reduction to replacement, 
respectively. 
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But note the consequence. The more dissimilar TR is with respect to TR*, the more 
appropriate it is for replacement. Yet, by virtue of the complex many-many mappings 
between the kind terms of special science and the kind terms of physical science, type 
irreducible special science theories are exceedingly dissimilar to anything derivable from 
base-level physical theory. Hence, by the Similarity Assumption, these theories must be 
replaced – surely the wrong result. Happily, in two sections hence I will propose a 
broader continuum from reduction to replacement where “similarity” is replaced by 
formal conditions of “connectedness” to base-level theories, which allows viable or at 
least useful type irreducible theories to be retained in spite of their dissimilarity to base-
level theories.   
 
VII. The New Wave View of Token Reduction 
At first glance, some members of the New Wave appear to look favorably upon 
the practice of token reduction. In particular, Hooker (1981, pp. 504-507) outlines an 
account of “function-to-structure token reduction,” and Bickle (1998, pp.155-163) 
endorses it. But this New Wave token reduction differs from the standard variety 
proposed by Fodor and Kimbrough. Simply put, unlike the standard account, New Wave 
token reduction appears to be a guised form of eliminativism. I have presented the details 
elsewhere, so I will be brief (Endicott, 2001, pp.388-391; see also Wright, 2000). Hooker 
illustrates New Wave token reduction by employing something roughly parallel to the 
familiar tripartite taxonomy employed within cognitive science -- the semantic (L1), 
syntactic (L2), and the physical mechanistic (L3) levels of description. He constructs a 
target theory T out of higher-level L1 and L2 predicates, and the basic-level theory T* out 
of mechanistic L3 predicates, claiming that:  
 
Systems of a type S of class T are contingently token/token identical with systems 
of type S’ in class T* = df every instance (token) of a type S system externally 
classified as in class T is contingently identical with some instance (token) of a 
type S’ system externally classified as in class T* (1981, 504). 
 
So far so familiar. But the standard idea of token identity involves the same object 
exemplifying two distinct properties, a token identity with types distinct. In an inter-level 
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case, this means property dualism, the same object having both an irreducible higher-
level property and a lower-level property. Yet the New Wave rejects property dualism.  
So New Wave token reduction must be something else called “token reduction,” and it 
seems to be a version of eliminativism. When considering the possibility that each 
functional property is either (i) type reducible by being directly identified with a 
mechanistic property or (ii) token reducible by having its instance identified with an 
instance of a mechanistic property, Hooker says that “there are no properties 
corresponding to predicates falling under case (ii) above if by this one means a single 
property common to all instances,” and that such cases may require “resisting putative L1 
+ L2 semantics” (1981, p.507). Similarly, Bickle says: “In such cases we conclude that 
the functional-level predicates fail to denote” (1998, p.162). So this is no familiar token 
reduction where the same object exemplifies two distinct properties. Only one property is 
retained, and thus only its tokens remain.   
The latter point is worth emphasizing. On the New Wave scheme there are no 
tokens of the type irreducible properties. As I stated before, if there is no phlogiston, then 
nothing is token identical with phlogiston (Endicott, 2001, p.390). Aside from the types 
and tokens of T’s observational consequences that are better explained by T*, there are 
just the items picked out by mechanistic-level predicates, including perhaps some 
functional-level predicates that have been semantically “reconstructed” to denote 
mechanistic-level properties (Hooker, 1981, pp. 507-12). So the label “token reduction” 
is justified, apparently, by the lingering use of some reconstructed functional predicates.  
 This eliminative interpretation of New Wave token reduction also accords well 
with the New Wave tendency to view higher-level irreducible theories as radically false 
targets for elimination. 7 For example, Churchland (1981) has famously argued that 
propositional attitude psychology should be eliminated. And, although Bickle (1998, 
pp.205-206) describes a more nuanced revisionary position according to which folk 
psychology errs about the fine-grained causal structure but succeeds in describing the 
“gross abstract structure” of cognition, given the exhaustive reading of “reduction or 
replacement” discussed earlier, Bickle must believe that the limited set of true and 
successful descriptions from folk psychology pick out properties that reduce to 
neurochemical properties.  
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However, like Schaffner’s pragmatic attitude toward presently type irreducible 
theories, the outlook of the New Wave toward the broader practice of science also 
permits the use of type irreducible theories for token reduction. Thus, Bickle’s seemingly 
ruthless claim that psychological explanations “become otiose” and are rendered 
“impotent” by neuroscientific theories presupposes an “accomplished (and not just an 
anticipated) cellular/molecular explanation” (2003, p.110, his emphasis). Moreover, even 
when base-level (presumably reductive) explanations have been achieved, Bickle allows 
“some residual, purely heuristic tasks” (loc. cit.). Consequently, it is consistent with 
Bickle’s views that when base-level reductive explanations have not been achieved, one 
may retain presently type irreducible theories for heuristic reasons. But this kind of 
philosophical outlook is no eliminativism. For example, instrumentally interpreted 
theories are neither reduced nor replaced. Like their realist counterparts -- property 
dualist theories -- they are retained in their presently irreducible forms precisely because 
of their convenience and overall utility. My proposal will thus make room for more 
conciliatory pragmatic and instrumental attitudes by expanding the S Continuum so that it 
is no longer exhausted by theories that are either wholly reduced or replaced or broken 
down into parts that are reduced or replaced.  
 
VIII. The Space Between Reduction and Replacement 
To avoid confusion with the kind of “retention” that occurs with type reduction, 
let “reception” designate the space between reduction and replacement where type-
irreducible theories are retained for the purpose of token reduction. Moreover, call the 
continuum that contains a space for the reception of type-irreducible theories the 
Continuum from Reduction to Reception to Replacement. I will sketch, in programmatic 
fashion, some necessary conditions that a pair of theories must satisfy for placement 
along this 3R Continuum. Intuitively speaking, the 3R Continuum registers the degree of 
“connectedness” between basic and nonbasic theories. Being mindful that the meaning of 
the subscript ‘R’ for theory T now varies in one of three ways -- reduced, received, and 
replaced -- the conditions for placement are as follows.  
R1. Nonbasic TR is a reduced theory. The general terms of a nonbasic theory 
positioned at the reductive end of the 3R Continuum are connected to the general terms of 
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the base-level theory in the way required by S Deduction. There is a direct (for TR) or 
approximating (for TR*) derivation from a base-level TB by means of connecting 
principles that express property identities between the two theoretical domains. Since 
type identities are established, the token identities are secure. 
R2. Nonbasic TR is a received theory. Approximating revisions no longer secure 
type reduction. The general terms of a nonbasic theory positioned at the receptive area of 
the 3R Continuum are no longer connected to the general terms of the base-level theory 
by principles that express property identities between the two theoretical domains. But 
there exist connections between the properties supplied by nonreductive determinative 
relations like supervenience (Kim, 1984; Horgan, 1993) and realization (Endicott, 2005). 
So the properties of TR, or the properties of TR* when the former has been corrected, are 
determined by the properties of the base-level TB in a way compatible with their 
nonidentity. Yet there remain connections between the singular terms of the nonbasic 
theory and the singular terms of the basic theory that establish token identities, and these 
connections conform to the token reduction functions presented earlier.  
R3. Nonbasic TR is a replaced theory. Whether general or singular, very few terms 
of the nonbasic theory positioned at the replacement end of the 3R Continuum are 
connected to the terms of the base-level theory. The ontology is no longer anchored into 
the world. The types and tokens of TR are thus eliminated in favor of the types and tokens 
of the base-level TB that, by virtue of its superior resources, provides a better explanation 
of the observable phenomena originally targeted by the displaced TR.  
So I have replaced talk of strong to weak analogies between nonbasic and base-
level derivable theories with a more precise analysis in terms of the kind of connections 
between them, and I have replaced the exhaustive reading of reduction or replacement 
with a broader set of conditions that allow the reception of type irreducible theories that 
are subject to token reduction. However, my aim is not to portray a broad nonreductive 
view of the sciences but to expand the range of partial reductions via token identities. Put 
in a different way, I have not simply reinterpreted “unification” in a nonreductive way 
that allows for the supervenience or realization of type irreducible theories. That 
misconceives the point entirely. As a conservative extension of the models under 
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consideration, “unification” still means ontological unification via cross-theoretic 
identities. Thus, in the service of this august reductive goal, and in summary fashion: 
 
3R CONTINUUM: there is a continuum of connections between the nonbasic TR 
and its base-level derivable counterpart TR*, with type-identities justifying type 
reduction, token identities justifying token reduction, and the lack of such 
identities justifying replacement of the ontology of TR. 
 
The 3R Continuum describes a very broad inter-level slice of the world. But this is 
as it should be. Reduction and other forms of scientific unification cannot be considered 
in isolation from the larger body of scientific practice in which they occur.  
 
IX. Concluding Remarks 
 My primary goal has not been to place particular theory pairs on the 3R 
Continuum, or contest their placement. Granted, particular cases and general theories 
must be brought into reflective equilibrium. But my focus has been on developing a 
general theory of scientific unification from reduction to replacement by exploring how 
the possibilities of token reduction can be situated within that framework. Yet the matter 
of token reduction is not trivial, and there are a number of problems that should be 
resolved once the general outline of a model has been presented. Thus, I will end by 
citing one problem, then briefly indicate how it might be addressed, leaving a fully 
adequate discussion of these points for another time.  
   Simply put, there is a problem about token correspondence for inter-level 
theories. As previously mentioned, without type-correspondence, there is no guarantee 
that two theories drawn from different scientific levels of inquiry will carve up the world 
into the same naturally isolated particulars that are subject to the same explanations and 
predictions. Focusing on the psychophysical case, Stephen Stich presents a list of authors 
from Winograd to Minsky who offer models of cognitive phenomena wherein “no single 
component or naturally isolated part can be said to underlie the expression of a belief or 
desire” (1983, p.240). 8 Indeed, semantic networks are often thought to display the 
phenomenon in question, since there may be large areas of computational activity that are 
shared by several belief states all at once so that, if particular beliefs exist, they arise from 
the base-level states in a more holistic fashion. Moreover, a more general token 
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correspondence problem seems to be a natural consequence of the fact that, given a 
mereological account of levelhood from the microphysical to the macrosocial, each level 
n of scientific inquiry typically involves much larger aggregates of particulars than the 
more basic level n-1. 
In response, one might endorse a solution that utilizes constructivist procedures, 
composing aggregates of base-level objects in a way that preserves token identities. The 
smaller particulars of the base-level theory are combined by logical operations into 
aggregates that are token identical with the particulars of the nonbasic theory. But, until 
more is said, these constructed aggregates may not play any role in the base-level theory  
-- no more than financial institutions and labor forces play in fundamental physics. I 
prefer a more scientifically inspired solution. 
As a start, one might concede that token reductions are rarely accomplished 
because of the different goals and principles that operate at different levels of scientific 
inquiry. Perhaps token reductions apply only at the borderline of neighboring disciplines 
where interests converge. Nevertheless, there is a process that can bring them about, 
namely, the process of co-evolution when it adjusts two neighboring theories until a 
mechanism is discovered whereby some ontology of the one theory realizes or 
implements some ontology of the other.  
More specifically, co-evolution is a process where the concepts and languages of 
two theories at different levels of inquiry develop together and mutually influence each 
other (Wimsatt, 1976, pp.230-237; see also McCauley, 1996). For example, 
neuroscientists employ psychofunctional criteria to guide the identification brain 
structures, while cognitive scientists employ information about brain structures to guide 
their theories of information processing (there is a nice discussion in Bechtel and 
Mundale, 1999). This co-evolution may continue until, by the continued calibration of 
one theory to the other, a base-level mechanism is discovered which supplies the now 
naturally isolated unit for token reduction. That is, the base-level mechanism yields a 
token of the pertinent nonbasic realized type. This idea can be captured by a familiar 
form of functional explanation. Employing the symbolism of the token reduction 
functions presented earlier, one begins with a functional analysis: x has a nonbasic 
property F = x has something that plays a given functional role R. Then one utilizes the 
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empirical discovery that a type of base-level physical mechanism P plays the functional 
role R. And from this one can draw the conclusion: if x has the mechanism property P 
then x has the nonbasic property F. In other words, one can deduce that the same x has 
properties F and P -- the desired token identity. To illustrate with a concrete case, 
consider the Crick-Koch Hypothesis (1990) that the mechanism for human visual 
awareness is 40-70 Hz neural oscillations in the human cortex: 
 
(i) x has visual awareness = x has something that plays the functional role of 
controlling information from the visual input system in a global fashion with 
respect to attention, short-term memory, and behavioral outputs. 
(ii) x has 40-70 Hz oscillations of neurons in the human visual cortex => x has 
something that plays the functional role of controlling information from the visual 
input system in a global fashion with respect to attention, short-term memory, and 
behavioral outputs. 
(iii) x has 40-70 Hz oscillations of neurons in the human visual cortex => x has 
visual awareness. 9 
 
Again, the same x has the neural property and the functional awareness property. 
Interestingly, the foregoing argument also reveals a merger of the two traditions of 
reduction mentioned at the outset of this paper. Reduction as mechanistic explanation and 
reduction as ontological unification via cross-theoretic identity meet at the point of token 
reduction. 
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Notes 
1 Sklar gives a more cautious reading, saying that Nagel’s text “appears” to signal a 
change: “Originally Nagel insisted upon theses correlatory hypotheses being universally 
quantified bi-conditionals, with one side of the bi-conditional containing as its only 
descriptive term one of the terms peculiar to the reduced theory. Subsequently he appears 
to have weakened this condition, allowing the laws to take other forms as well” (Sklar 
1967, p.118).  
2 Patricia Kitcher (1980) also emphasizes this point in her response to Richardson. I add 
that both Schaffner’s General Reduction-Replacement model and the basic New Wave 
approach likewise associate reduction with cross-theoretic identities. For Schaffner, the 
identities surface in the interpretation of the connecting principles that facilitate the 
derivation of either the original or corrected targets for reduction (1967, p.144). For the 
New Wave, the identities surface as a consequence of a comparative smooth analogy 
between the original and corrected theories (P.M. Churchland, 1985, p.11; Hooker, 1981, 
p.45; P.S. Churchland, 1986, p.284; Bickle, 1998, pp.77-78). Indeed, I have shown that 
these ontological consequences imply traditional biconditional bridge laws that license 
cross-theoretic property identities (Endicott, 1998a, pp.67-72). Perhaps for this reason, 
Bickle (2003, pp.31-39) has recently adopted a Carnapian-inspired, “internalist,” 
“metascientific” attitude that rejects “metaphysical” identity questions altogether. I do not 
have the space to address Bickle’s return to Positivist themes here.  
3 The label was first applied by Bickle (1996, p.57).  
4 Other New Wave proposals are less central in the sense that they vary from one New 
Wave advocate to the next. For example, both Paul Churchland and Bickle adopt a 
nonsentential view of scientific theories. But Churchland (1990) prefers to think of them 
in the connectionist tradition as vectors through an abstract state-space, while Bickle 
(1998) prefers to think of them in the semantic tradition as model-theoretic structures.  
 23 
5 Maurice Schouten has understandably requested that I clarify my charge about co-
evolution, since advocates of the New Wave also accept the co-evolution of theories. My 
earlier argument was that their account of co-evolution appears inconsistent with CH 
Construction, given that the “mutual” interplay of co-evolution includes the top-down 
role of nonbasic concepts in constructing the corrected theory TR* (Hooker, 1981, 
pp.513-514; Bickle, 1996, p.76, 1998, pp.148, 201). In the very least, if one accepts top-
down influences of a nonbasic TR on a resulting base-level TR*, then, as I stated before, 
CH Construction’s advertised exclusion of the concepts and language of TR must appear 
superficial from the historical development of the sciences, since it ignores the interplay 
between basic and nonbasic theories (Endicott, 1998a, p.66).  
6 Hull (1974, esp. pp.38-42) stressed the complicated many-many mappings for 
molecular genetics. For a general analysis of inter-level one-many and many-one 
relations, see Endicott (1994, 1998b).  
7 Compared to the eliminative spirit that seems to underlie his earlier remarks on 
function-to-structure token reduction, Hooker’s later work expresses a “naturalism” that 
does not require reduction, being consistent with “dualisms of many sorts” (1987, p.261). 
8 In addition to the sources cited by Stich, see also Horgan and Tye (1985). Given the 
failure of token correspondence, some have drawn anti-realist conclusions about the 
ontology of the higher-level theory. But, as Horgan and Tye (1985, p.438, fn.13) observe, 
that conclusion can be resisted. 
9 Note that the second premise and the conclusion are couched in terms of one-way 
conditionals that express mere sufficient conditions. If they were biconditionals or the 
stronger connections of identity, one would have a type reduction. Crick and Koch 
apparently take the mechanisms to license type reduction, I do not. I think there can be 
visual consciousness realized by some mechanism other than t40-70 Hz neural 
oscillations.   
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